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This is an action brought by grantors under a deed of trust to stop non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings. The defendants moved to dismiss the action on the grounds that the amended 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court agreed 
and entered judgment dismissing the action. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On or about August 7, 2014, Craig and Serena Lou Watson filed an action against Bank 
of America, N.A, GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc. ("GreenPoint"), ReconTrust Company 
("ReconTrust"), Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. ("Northwest Trustee"), Green Tree Servicing, 
LLC ("Green Tree"), Federal National Mortgage Association, and Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") asserting a number of causes of action based on purported 
issues with their mortgage loan, including breach of contract, defect in the chain of title 
regarding the property, unjust enrichment, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, violation of the statute of frauds, violation of the Idaho Uniform Commercial Code 
("UCC"), violation of the Idaho Credit Code, fraud, and violation of the notice requirements of 
LC. §§ 45-1505-1506 on August 7, 2014 with the District Court for the First Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Kootenai. 1 The Watsons filed an amended complaint 
on August 25, 2014 asserting the same causes of action.2 
1 R. at 16-48. 
2 R. at 49-57. 
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a 
trust 
d'Alene, Idaho. 3 The Watsons recited that a Notice of Default was recorded in November 
2008 due to non-payment since July of 2008.4 The Watsons entered into a loan modification 
agreement with Bank of America and returned the signed document to Bank of America on or 
about July l, 20 l 0, but they allegedly did not receive a fully-executed version of the agreement. 5 
The notice of default was thereafter rescinded. 6 The Watsons further contended that they made 
payments as agreed, but that Bank of America failed to credit their payments properly. 7 A 
second notice of default was recorded in November 2013 and the non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings were instituted.8 The Watsons asserted that an unidentified error in the chain of title 
caused the notice of default and notice of sheriffs sale to be invalid.9 
The parties entered into a stipulation preliminarily enjoining the non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings in September of 201 10 On June 1, 201 Bank of America, ReconTrust, and 
GreenPoint (collectively, "Bank of America") moved to dismiss the Watsons' amended 
complaint asserting that the complaint failed to state any claim upon which relief could be 
granted. 11 Bank of America also requested that the district court take judicial notice of various 
3 R. at 51. 
4 R. at 52. 
s Id. 
6 Id. 
7 R. at 52-53. 
8 R.at53. 
9 Id. 
10 R. at 10; Tr., p. 24:13-16. 
11 R. at 242-263. 
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were accurate resort 
to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned" under Idaho Rule of Evidence 
20l(b). 13 Moreover, it contended that the district court should take notice of the documents in 
making its decision on the motion to dismiss because they were referenced in and relied on by 
the amended complaint, even though they were not attached to it. 14 The motion for judicial 
notice was properly supported by an affidavit from Jeffrey Bower, Bank of America's attorney. 15 
In its memorandum in support of the motion to dismiss, Bank of America argued that the 
Watsons' complaint should be dismissed in regards to ReconTrust and GreenPoint because the 
Watsons failed to assert any claims against them. 16 It further argued that the Watsons' amended 
complaint was too vague to put it on notice as to what claims were actually being brought against 
Bank of America. 17 Among other things, Bank of America noted that, although the Watsons 
apparently attempted to assert claims under the Idaho UCC, the Statute of Frauds, and the Idaho 
Credit Code, they failed to specify how those statutes were violated or even to what provisions of 
the statutes they were referring. 18 
12 R. at 58-238. 
13 R. at 236. 
14 R. at 237. 
15 R. at 58-61. 
16 R. at 248. 
17 Id. 
1s Id. 
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contract cause 
was 19 It to identify which 
provision of the note, deed of trust, or loan modification agreement was breached by Bank 
America?) It also averred that the Watsons did not allege their own performance under the loan 
modification agreement.21 Bank of America asserted that the Watsons did not make any factual 
allegations regarding when they made payments to Bank of America or the amount of those 
payments.22 Moreover, it contended that there was no requirement in the loan modification 
agreement that Bank of America return an executed copy to the Watsons.23 
Bank of America noted that allegations regarding a defect in the chain of title leading to 
the non-judicial foreclosure were not directed at it because it was not the foreclosing entity; 
however, Bank of America argued that the publicly recorded documents established that the 
foreclosing entity complied with Idaho foreclosure law.24 
Bank of America also asserted that the Watsons' cause of action for unjust enrichment 
was also insufficiently pled because the Watsons failed to assert how it would be inequitable for 
Bank of America to retain payments that the Watsons were required to make under the loan 
modification agreement. 25 Bank of America next contended that, because the breach of contract 
19 R. at 250-252. 
20 R. at 251. 
21 Id. 
22 R. at 252. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 R. at 253-254. 
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was cause 
covenant faith dealing was 26 
Although Bank of America was not the foreclosing entity, it addressed the Watsons' 
cause of action relating to the foreclosing entity's standing to foreclose and to enforce the terms 
of the loan. 27 Bank of America noted that the W atsons seemed to contend that an unidentified 
issue with the chain of title caused Green Tree and Northwest Trustee to lack standing to 
foreclose. 28 In response, Bank of America argued that the recorded chain of title established that 
Green Tree was entitled to foreclose on the deed of trust and that Green Tree was entitled to 
appoint and did properly appoint Northwest Trustee as the successor trustee.29 Bank of America 
additionally argued that the Watsons' fraud cause of action failed as a matter of law because it 
lacked the pleading specificity required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9.3° Finally, Bank of 
America asserted that the Watsons' causes of action for declaratory relief and injunctive relief 
both failed as a matter of law because the Watsons failed to sufficiently plead any cause of 
action. 31 
Thereafter, the Watsons' attorney made several filings in response to the motion to 
dismiss, including a motion to continue pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) and 
supporting affidavits filed on June 5, 2015 and June 19, 2015.32 On July 1, 2015, the Watsons 
26 R. at 255-256. 
27 R. at 256. 
2s Id. 
29 R. at 256-257. 
30 R. at 259-260. 
31 R. at 261. 
32 R. at 264-265, 278-286. 
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a 
the 34 Watsons 
asserted generally that the allegations of their complaint were sufficient to put Bank of America 
on notice as to what was being pled against it and that they should be allowed to conduct 
discovery to ascertain the facts necessary to bolster their claims. 35 The Watsons also argued that 
Bank of America's motion to dismiss should have been converted into a motion for summary 
judgment.36 Craig Watson also submitted an affidavit that was not notarized in support of the 
reply.37 
On June 22, 2015, the Watsons' counsel filed a motion to withdraw that was granted on 
July 8, 2015.38 On July 24, 2015, the Watsons filed a notice indicating that they intended to 
proceed pro se. 39 Northwest Trustee filed a joinder in the motion to dismiss on 
August l 9, 2015.40 The district court heard the motion to dismiss on September 2, 2015.41 
At the hearing on the motion to dismiss, the district court (Hon. Lansing L. Hayes) 
granted Bank of America's motion for judicial notice.42 However, the court did not convert the 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment because it noted that it "analyzed [the 
motion to dismiss] purely on the pleadings filed by the plaintiffs in their complaint and their 
33 R. at 295-296. 
34 R. at 317. 
35 R. at 317-318. 
36 R. at 318-3 19. 
37 R. at 299-314. 
38 R. at 11-13. 
39 R. at 13. 
40 R. at 327-329. 
41 R. at 332-333. 
42 Tr. p. 26:3-4. 




d · c: • d 44 respon to a motion 1or summary JU gment. 
The district court stated its findings and conclusions on the record at the hearing and did 
not issue a written memorandum opinion.45 The district court found that the Watsons failed to 
state any claims against ReconTrust or GreenPoint in their amended complaint.46 It also noted 
that the Watsons failed to sufficiently plead any of their causes of action.47 The district court 
declined to review further evidence at the hearing.48 
The district court dismissed the Watsons' amended complaint on September 11, 2015.49 
The Watsons appealed the order of dismissal to this Court on October 20, 2015. 50 
C. Statement of Facts 
On or about May 25, 2005, Craig and Serena Lou Watson executed a note and deed of 
trust reflecting a debt in the principal balance of $164,800.00 secured by real property located at 
890 S. Star Gamet Road, Coeur d'Alene, Idaho. 51 The deed of trust identified GreenPoint as 
lender, North Idaho Title as trustee, and MERS as beneficiary as nominee for the lender and its 
43 Tr. p. 28:9-11. 
44T '"J8·1 8 if. p.""' . - . 
45 Tr. p. 22: 1 
46 Tr. p. 25:23-24. 
47 Tr. pp. 25-27. 
48 Tr. pp. 30:22-31 :2. 
49 R. at 330-331. 
50 R. at 335 
51 R. at 24-40, 51. 
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52 
as 
a 53 were a 
loan modification in May 2010 that was executed and returned to Bank of America on or about 
July 1, 2010. 54 Thereafter, ReconTrust recorded a rescission of the notice of default on August 
10, 2010.55 On or about December 3, 2010, MERS recorded a Corporation Assignment of Deed 
of Trust transferring its interest under the deed of trust to Bank of America, successor by merger 
to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP.56 On 
July 20, 2013, Bank of America recorded an Assignment transferring its interest under the deed 
of trust to Green Tree. 57 On November 5, 2013, Green Tree recorded an Appointment of 
Successor Trustee, naming Northwest Trustee as successor trustee under the deed of trust. 58 
After the prior Notice of Default was rescinded in August 2010, a second Notice of Default was 
recorded on November 5, 2013, reciting that the Watsons failed to meet their obligations under 
the loan modification agreement and that their loan was in default as of September 2010.59 
52 R. at 27-28. 
53 R. at 52. 
54 R. at 43-46, 52. 
55 R. at 47. 
56 R. at 53, 65. 
57 R. at 53, 67. 
58 R. at 51, 69. 
59 R. at 48. 
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restates on as 
1. Did the district court err in dismissing the Watsons' complaint under Rule 
12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted? 
Have the Watsons demonstrated that the district court committed reversible error 
m taking judicial notice of matters outside of the complaint without converting Bank of 
America's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment? 
III. ST AND ARD OF REVIE\V 
Review of a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil 
Procedure 12(b)(6) is de nova. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648 
(2010). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure l 2(b )( 6), 
"the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in [its] favor." 
Young v. City of Ketchum, 137 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2002). After all such 
inferences have been drawn, a dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "when it appears 
beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would 
entitle [the plaintiff] to relief." Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535, 536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. 
App. 1992) ( citing Wackerli v. Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960)). If all 
factual allegations in the complaint, even if true, are insufficient to demonstrate the elements of a 
claim then dismissal is appropriate. Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 
(2009). Even though the Court must accept well-pled factual allegations as true, "it is not 
enough for a complaint to make conclusory allegations." Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Comm 'n., 
OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 9 
non-movant to 
non-
movant hopes the court to draw from these facts.") 
IV. ARGUMENT 
The Watsons Do Not Challenge The Ruling Of The District Court Finding That 
They Did Not Plead Any Claims Against GreenPoint And ReconTrust. 
In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), the argument section of an appellant's 
opening brief must contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented 
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript 
and record relied upon. I.A.R. 35(a)(6). This Court has stated that it will not search the record 
on appeal for error; instead, an appellant must assert his assignments of error with particularity 
and provide sufficient support for his arguments. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 
1146, 1152 (2010). "A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the district court, 
without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue." Id. 
(internal citation omitted). Assignments of error which are not supported by argument and 
citation to authority in the opening brief will not be considered on appeal. Jorgensen v. 
Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P .3d 450, 454 (2008). This rule is applied equally to pro se 
litigants. See Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003) 
(stating "[p ]ro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an 
attorney."); see also Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 57, 244 P.3d 197, 201 (2010) (noting that 
"[p ]ro se litigants are not accorded special consideration because they chose to represent 
themselves .... "). 
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assert 
to contest s 
point in their opening brief or in their opposition to the motion to dismiss. Thus, this Court 
should affirm the decision of the district court dismissing the amended complaint in its entirety 
in regards to ReconTrust and GreenPoint. 
B. The \Vatsons' Allegations Are Too Vague To Put Bank Of America On Notice Of 
The Claims Asserted Against It Under The Idaho Uniform Commercial Code, 
Statue Of Frauds, And The Idaho Credit Code. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8( a)(l) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim 
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." LR.C.P. 8(a)(1 ). "Although a complaint need not 
identify the statutory basis for relief nor include a formal statement of the cause of action being 
pursued, there must be some indication of the theory of recovery supporting the relief sought-a 
naked recitation of the facts alone is insufficient." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802, 
808, 229 P .3d 1164, 1170 (2010) ( emphasis in original). "The key to a valid pleading is that it 
must put the other party on notice of the claims against it." .Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty 
Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387,393 (2010) (citing Youngblood v. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665, 
668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008)). 
In their amended complaint, the Watsons asserted generally that Bank of America 
violated the Statute of Frauds, the Idaho UCC, and the Idaho Credit Code without explanation of 
how Bank of America breached any of the statutes or even what provisions of the statute they 
asserted were violated. Therefore, the amended complaint was defective because it did not put 
OPENING BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS - 11 
statutes. 
causes 
L The \Vatsons' Cause Of Action For Violation Of The Idaho UCC Is Too 
Vague To Put Bank Of America On Notice Of The Claim. 
Idaho UCC defines a "[p ]erson entitled to enforce" a negotiabie instrument to 
include "(i) the holder of the instrument, (ii) a nonholder in possession of the instrument who has 
the rights of a holder, or (iii) a person not in possession of the instrument who is entitled to 
enforce the instrument pursuant to section 28-3-309 or 28-3-418 (4)." 
I.C. § 28-3-301. The enforcement of an instrument pursuant to the UCC is not equivalent to 
conducting a trustee's sale pursuant to the Deed of Trust. Trotter v. Bank of New York Mellon, 
152 Idaho 842, 846-47, 275 P.3d 857, 861-62 (2012) (rejecting the argument that the foreclosing 
party must prove it is entitled to enforce the note order to have standing to foreclose); see also 
~Mussell v. Afortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc., 2014 WL 4793919, *7 (D.Idaho Sept, 
25, 2014) (finding that plaintiffs' claim, that defendants were not entitled to enforce the Note 
because they did not comply with the UCC, failed). 
The Idaho Deed of Trust Act does not require that a trustee prove its standing to foreclose 
prior to initiating non-judicial foreclosure. Trotter, 152 Idaho at 846, 275 P.3d at 861. In 
accordance with the Idaho Deed of Trust Act, "[a] trustee may initiate non-judicial foreclosure 
proceedings on a deed of trust without first proving ownership of the underlying note .... " Id., 
152 Idaho at 846, 275 P.3d at 862 (2012). The federal courts have agreed and rejected a 
requirement that defendants prove ownership of the underlying note, in order to have standing to 
foreclose. Cherian v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et. al., No. l:12-cv-00110-BLW, 2012 
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must 
a 
Trust Act] is not a judicial proceeding." Trotter, 152 Idaho at 846, 275 P.3d at 861. "The 
procedures to foreclose on trust deeds outside of the judicial process provide the expresslane 
alternative to foreclosure in the judicial system and strip borrowers of protections embedded in a 
judicial foreclosure." Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Appel, 143 Idaho 42, 48, 137 P.3d 
429, 435 (2006). Because the Idaho Deed of Trust Act provides an alternative that is "outside 
the judicial process," it sets forth all of the requirements to foreclose on a deed of trust. Trotter, 
152 Idaho at 846, 275 P.3d at 861. 
In their amended complaint, the Watsons asserted generally that the note was a negotiable 
instrument governed by the Idaho UCC. LC. § 28-3-101.60 The Watsons further claimed that 
there was a defect in the assignments in the chain of title that caused the second notice of default 
to be invalid. 61 Moreover, they contended that, "pursuant to the original Note and Deed of Trust 
and the Loan Modification Agreement, Plaintiffs performed by making the required payments to 
Defendant however, Defendant failed to credit Plaintiffs with said payments; failed to provide 
Plaintiffs with a copy of the signed Loan Modification Agreement in breach of said Note, Deed 
of Trust and Loan Modification, and have acted in ways that are unconscionable in violation of 
the Statute of Frauds, the Uniform Commercial Code, and the Idaho Credit Code."62 
60 R. at 51. 
61 R. at 53. 
62 R. at 53-54. 
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to 
trustee did not to non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings or that Green Tree did not have the authority to appoint 
Northwest Trustee as the successor trustee. In their brief: the Watsons claim that Bank of 
America obscured the identity of the party who was entitled to enforce the note and deed of 
trust.63 The Watsons assert that they were subjected to the risk of owing the debt to more than 
one party; however, they do not claim that more than one party has attempted to collect their debt 
at the same time. 64 
This Court, however, has already determined that the foreclosing entity is not required to 
demonstrate ownership of the note under the Idaho Deed of Trust Act prior to initiating non-
judicial foreclosure proceedings. Moreover, the recorded documents demonstrate a proper chain 
of title in this case. Here, MERS assigned the deed of trust to Bank of America, as successor by 
merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP, which 
was recorded December 3, 2010.65 Bank of America then assigned its interest in the deed of 
trust to Green Tree, which was recorded on July 29, 2013.66 Green Tree then executed an 
Appointment of Successor Trustee, naming Northwest Trustee as the trustee under the deed of 
trust, which was recorded on November 5, 2013.67 Also on November 5, 2013, a Notice of 
Default was recorded by Northwest Trustee on behalf of Green Tree, initiating the foreclosure 
63 Appellants' Brief, pp. 14-16. 
64 Id. 
65 R. at 65. 
66 R. at 67. 
67 R. at 69. 
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as successor 
trustee executing default. 
Watsons' cause of action for violation of the Idaho UCC was properly dismissed. 
2. The Watsons' Cause Of Action For Violation Of The Statute Of Frauds Is 
Too Vague To Put Bank Of America On Notice Of The Claim. 
The Idaho Statute of Frauds provides that, "[ n Jo estate or interest in real property, other 
than for leases for a tenn not exceeding one ( l) year, nor any trust or power over or concerning 
it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, 
otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed 
by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized by writing." LC. § 9-503. Moreover, "[a]n agreement for the leasing, 
for a longer period than one (1) year, or for the sale, of real property, or of an interest therein, 
and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the 
authority of the agent be in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged." LC. § 9-505. 
The Watsons asserted that Bank of America violated the Statute of Frauds in their 
amended complaint; however, it is unclear what actions of Bank of America allegedly violated 
the statute. All of the assignments and transfers were made in writing as previously discussed. 
The only document that the Watsons claim was not signed by Bank of America was the loan 
modification agreement, which the Watsons seek to enforce. The Watsons do not address their 
cause of action under the Statute of Frauds in their brief on appeal. Thus, this Court should not 
consider this claim on appeal. 
68 R. at 48. 
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The Watsons' Cause Of Action For Violation Of The Idaho Credit Code Is 
Too Vague To Put Bank Of America On Notice Of The Claim. 
their amended complaint, the W atsons contended that an unspecified "transaction" was 
governed by the Idaho Credit Code, I.C. § 28-41-101.69 They further asserted that Bank of 
Ame1ica acted in ways which were unconscionable in violation of the Idaho Credit Code.70 
However, the Watsons did not assert, with any specificity, how Bank of America violated the 
Idaho Credit Code or cite to any provision of the statute that was violated. The Watsons do not 
address their cause of action under the Idaho Credit Code in their brief on appeal; thus, this Court 
should not consider this claim on appeal. 
C. The Watsons' Cause Of Action For Breach Of Contract \Vas Insufficiently Pied. 
"The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, 
(b) the breach of the contract, ( c) the breach caused damages, and ( d) the amount of those 
damages." Afosell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 
(2013). A breach of contract is non-performance of any contractual duty of immediate 
performance. See Enterprise Inc. v. Nampa City, 536 P.2d 729, 735 (1975) (quoting 
RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 312 (1932)). "The burden of proving the 
existence of a contract and the fact of its breach is upon the plaintiff." O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 
Idaho 796,813,810 P.2d 1082, 1099 (1991). "The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove not only 
that it was injured, but that its injury was the result of the defondant's breach .... " Griffith v. 
Clear Lakes Trout Co., 143 Idaho 733, 740, 152 P.3d 604, 611 (2007). 
69 R. at 52. 
70 R. at 53-54. 
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cause contract 
trust 
a copy of the signed agreement. 71 The Watsons also asserted generally that they made payments 
under the loan modification agreement that were not credited properly. 72 In their amended 
complaint, the Watsons failed to provide any factual details regarding when they made the 
payments under the agreement, to whom they were made, and how they were improperly 
credited. Nor did the Watsons explain how the alleged breach caused them to discontinue 
making payments under the loan modification agreement. The Watsons did not point to any 
provision in the loan modification agreement requiring Bank of America to return a signed copy 
of the agreement to them. The Watsons' assertions failed to state the required elements of a 
breach of contract cause of action; thus, the district court did not err in dismissing this cause of 
action. 
In their Appellants' brief, the Watsons refer to the affidavit submitted by Craig Watson in 
support of their opposition to the motion to dismiss filed on July 1, 2015.73 The district court 
refused to consider the affidavit in the case below.74 Judge Haynes explained that the case was 
simply at the stage where it could be dismissed based upon the allegations made in the complaint 
and thus, he declined to consider any additional evidence submitted by the Watsons.75 
Moreover, the Watsons did not rely upon the affidavit in their opposition to the motion to 
71 R. at 53. 
72 R. at 53-54. 
73 R. at 299-314. 
Tr., p. 30:2-10. 
1s Id. 
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to to 76 
was not court on the to 
below, it should not be considered by this Court either. 
Apart from the fact that the district court did not consider the affidavit, the assertions 
contained therein are contradictory to the allegations of the verified amended complaint. In 
particular, the amended complaint recites that the Watsons signed the loan modification 
agreement ··on or about July 1, 2010 and returned it to BAC."77 The Watsons also attached a 
copy of the loan modification agreement with their signatures dated July I, 2010. 78 In his 
affidavit, Craig Watson asserted "[t]he loan modification is incorrectly dated 7/1/2010 and 
should have been dated 6/1/2010."79 Thus, he contends that a payment made by the Watsons in 
June 2010 should have been credited as the August 2010 payment under the loan modification.80 
However, as demonstrated by the Watsons' own pleadings and documents, no loan modification 
agreement was in effect in June 2010.81 The Watsons were not permitted to amend their 
complaint through the affidavit and an affidavit does not constitute a pleading. Edwards v. 
lvfortgage £lee. Registration Sys., Inc., 154 Idaho 511, 520, 300 P.3d 43, 52 (2013). 
Moreover, they did not explain why the loan modification agreement execution date was 
allegedly "incorrect." This self-serving affidavit, which conflicts with the allegations of the 
verified amended complaint, does nothing to substantiate the Watsons' breach of contract cause 
76 R. at 315-319. 
77 R. at 52. 
78 R. at 44-46. 
79 R. at 301-302. 
so Id. 
81 R. at 45, 52. 
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D. The Watsons' Cause Of Action For Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good 
Faith And Fair Dealing Was Insufficiently Pied. 
"Good faith and fair dealing are implied obligations uf every contract.'' Luzar v. vVestern 
Surety Co., 107 Idaho 693, 696, 692 P.2d 337, 340 (1984). A plaintiff can state a claim for 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing only when a party "violates, nullifies or 
significantly impairs any benefit of [a] contract.'' Jones v. Micron Tech, Inc., 129 Idaho 241, 923 
P. 2d 486, 491-492 (Ct. App. 1996) ( citation omitted); see also Idaho First Nat 'l Bank v. Bliss 
Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 289, 824 P.2d 841, 864 (1992) ("A violation of the implied 
covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in a cause of action separate from the 
breach of contract claims ... "). A claim for breach of the implied covenant must directly relate to 
breach of a specific contract term. Bushi v. Sage Health Care. PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 
P.3d 694, 698 (2009) (holding there was no breach of implied covenant where appellant could 
"identify no specific term within the operating agreement that [r]espondents breached."). 
As discussed above, the Watsons failed to point to any provision of any document that 
was breached by Bank of America in their amended complaint. That being the case, the 
Watsons' cause of action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing was 
also insufficiently pled. The Watsons do not address their cause of action for breach of the 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in their brief on appeal and, thus, this Court should not 
consider it 
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prima facie case of unjust enrichment requires proof of the following three elements: 
(a) that plaintiff conferred a benefit upon defendant; (b) that defendant appreciated the benefit; 
and (c) acceptance of the benefit under circumstances that would be inequitable for defendant to 
retain the benefit without payment to plaintiff for the value thereof Vanderford Co., Inc. v. 
Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 558, 165 P.2d 261, 272 (2007); see also Aberdeen-Springfield Canal 
Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82, 88, 982 P.2d 917, 923 (1999). "The essence of the quasi-
contractual theory of unjust enrichment is that the defendant has received a benefit which would 
be inequitable to retain at least without compensating the plaintiff to the extent that retention is 
unjust." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 462, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 
866 ( 1990). "Recovery cannot be had for unjust enrichment where there is an express contract 
covering the same subject matter." Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 636, 643, 249 P .3d 829, 836 
(2011). "The reason for this rule presently is that the remedies for breach of an express contract, 
whether by law or by express agreement, afford adequate relief." Thomas v. Thomas, 150 Idaho 
636, 643, 249 P.3d 829, 836 (2011) (quoting Triangle Min. Co., Inc. v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 753 
F.2d 734, 742 (9th Cir. 1985)). When an express agreement is found to be enforceable, a court is 
precluded from applying the "equitable doctrine of unjust enrichment in contravention of the 
express contract." Wolford v. Tankersley, 107 Idaho 1062, 1064, 695 P.2d 1201, 1203 (1984). 
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however, failed because the loan modification agreement was an express agreement governing 
payments made. There is no question that the agreement covered those payments. The Watsons' 
cause of action for unjust enrichment is simply a restatement of their breach of contract claim. 
Therefore, the Watsons cannot assert a cause of action for unjust enrichment as a matter of law 
because they had an adequate remedy available for breach of contract. 
Moreover, the Watsons did not assert that Bank of America was not entitled to the benefit 
of payments made on the loan. In fact, any payments made by the Watsons were made pursuant 
to their contractual obligation to repay the loan. The Watsons do not deny that they received the 
benefit of the original loan which was used to purchase the property. Thus, it is difficult to 
understand how Bank of America's retention of payments made under the loan documents could 
be inequitable. The Watsons do not address their unjust enrichment claim in their Appellants' 
brief and this Court should not consider it on appeal. 
82 R. at 54. 
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establish fraud, a plaintiff must allege: 
(1) A representation; (2) its falsity; (3) its materiality; (4) the 
speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his 
intent that it should be acted on by the person and in the manner 
reasonably contemplated; (6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity; 
(7) his reliance on the truth; (8) his right to rely thereon; (9) his 
consequent and proximate injury. 
Dengler v. Hazel Blessinger Family Trust, 141 Idaho 123, 127, 106 P.3d 449, 453 (2005). 
Similar to the heightened pleading standard for claims of fraud under Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 9(b), Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) also requires plaintiffs to plead allegations of 
fraud with the required factual specificity. Failure to do so is a sufficient ground for a motion to 
dismiss. Vess v. Ciba-Geigy Corp. USA, 317 F.3d l 097, ll 08 (9th Cir. 2003); Dengler, 141 
Idaho at 127; 106 P.3d at 453 (holding that I.R.C.P. 9(b) requires that fraud claims be pled with 
particularity). Rule 9 "requires the alleging party to specify what factual circumstances 
constitute fraud or mistake." Brown v. Greenheart, 335 P.3d 1, 9 (Idaho 2014). Thus a plaintiff 
who claims fraud "must state with particularity the circumstances constituting fraud" - including 
"the who, what, where, when and how" of the fraud. Vess, 317 F .3d at 1106-07. 
In the instant case, it is difficult to determine exactly what allegations of fraud were being 
made against Bank of America. The Watsons do not identify what statements Bank of America 
made that were false or misleading, much less identify any details regarding those 
representations. The Watsons contend that they relied on the loan modification and promises 
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83 
as not 
did they plead fraud as to the nine elements with the required particularity under Rule 9(b ). The 
Watsons also failed to allege any reliance on Bank of America's purported misrepresentations. 
This is particularly true because they had an underlying obligation to make payments pursuant to 
the terms of the note. Further, they failed to allege any damages as a result of the purported 
misrepresentation. The W atsons assert that, "they relied on false statements made by Defendants 
regarding modification of the loan," to their detriment. 84 At no point did the Watsons claim any 
injury from the purported misrepresentations by Bank of America. Therefore, the district court 
properly dismissed their fraud claim as insufficiently pled. 
In their brief on appeal, the Watsons fail to specifically address their fraud claim. 
Instead, they shift their focus stating that Bank of America made fraudulent statements regarding 
the identity of the owner of their obligation and that the assignment of the deed of trust from 
MERS to Bank of America was fraudulent. 85 Neither of these assertions was pled before the 
district court and neither should be considered by this Court for the first time on appeal. See 
KEB Enters., LP v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 752, 101 P.3d 690, 696 (2005) ("This Court's 
longstanding rule is that it will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal."). 
83 R. at 54. 
84 R. at 55. 
85 Appellants' Brief, p. 14, 17, 19. 
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Idaho Deed of Trust Act requires that a recorded notice of default: (a) state the 
name(s) of the trustor(s); (b) state the book and page where the deed of trust is recorded or give 
the description of the property; ( c) contain a statement that there was a breach of the obligation 
secured by the deed of trust and set forth the nature of that breach; and ( d) state the election to 
sell or cause the property to be sold to satisfy such obligation. LC. § 45-1505(3). It further 
requires that the deed of trust, all assignments thereof, and the appointment of successor trustee 
be recorded. Id. at§ 45-1505(1). Section 45-1506 sets forth the requirements for the notice of 
trustee's sale. LC. § 45-1506. "These are the only requirements that precede foreclosure." 
Trotter, 152 Idaho at 847,275 P.3d at 862. 
Under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act, "[ c ]ourts of record within their respective 
jurisdictions shall have power to declare rights, status, and other legal relations, whether or not 
further relief is or could be claimed." LC.§ 10-1201. "As a general rule, a declaratory judgment 
can only be rendered in a case where an actual or justiciable controversy exists." Harris v. 
Cassia County, 106 Idaho 513,516,681 P.2d 988, 991 (1984). 
In their amended complaint, the Watsons requested declaratory relief "for violation of 
notice requirements of Idaho Code§§ 45-1505 and 45-1506 in an amount as may be proven at 
trial [and] declaring the non-judicial foreclosure invalid."86 These allegations appear to be 
directed at the foreclosing entity's standing to foreclose and not at Bank of America. As 
demonstrated by the Watsons' own allegations, the notice of default issued by ReconTrust on 
s6 Id. 





In their brief, the Watsons contend that the initial assignment of the deed of trust from 
MERS to Bank of America was "void" and "illegal;" thus, invalidating all of the other links in 
the chain of title.88 In support of this contention, they cite the Idaho bankruptcy case of In re 
Wilhelm, 407 B.R. 492 (D. Idaho) and the New York case of Bank ofNew York v. Silverberg, 86 
A.D.3d 274, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2011). As a primary matter, these contentions were not raised 
by the W atsons in their amended complaint or in their opposition to the motion to dismiss and 
cannot be considered by this Court now. Moreover, this Court has already decided that, under 
Idaho law, MERS is a valid deed of trust beneficiary as nominee for the lender and its successors 
and assigns. 
This Court considered MERS's role in making assignments of deeds of trust in Trotter, 
152 Idaho at 842, 275 P.3d at 857. In that case, the appellant argued that MERS was not a 
proper beneficiary under the Idaho Trust Deeds Act. The appellant argued that MERS was a 
"nominal beneficiary," despite being named as a beneficiary in the deed of trust, and thus, had no 
authority to assign its interest in the deed of trust to Bank of New York Mellon. Trotter, 152 
Idaho 847, 275 P.3d at 862. This Court, however, found that the Appellant provided no 
argument or authority in support of his claim. 
87 R. at 47, 52. 
88 R. at 2. 
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at at a 
stop the foreclosure sale of her property arguing that the defendants did not have legal standing 
to initiate foreclosure and that MERS could not legally be the beneficiary of the deed of trust. Id. 
at 46. This Court rejected the argument finding that, "MERS, as beneficiary, was acting solely 
as the nominee of the lender and its successors and assigns. A nominee is a person designated to 
act in place of another, [ usually] in a very limited way." Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). This Court went on to note that naming MERS, as beneficiary in its 
representative capacity for the lender, was no different than naming the lender as the beneficiary; 
thus, "having MERS the named beneficiary as nominee for the lender conforms to the 
requirements of a deed of trust under Idaho law." Id. See also Hobson v. Wells Fargo Bank, 
NA., 2012 WL 505917 at *5 (D. Idaho 2012) (finding MERS had authority to assign the 
beneficial interest in the deed of trust); see also Deckys v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, 2013 
WL 3081947 (D. Idaho 2013) (rejecting the position that MERS cannot assign its interests in the 
deed of trust). 
The cases cited by the Watsons are inapposite and do not support their contentions. In 
Trotter, this Court specified that the holding in In re Withem, was related "to standing in 
bankruptcy proceedings and whether MERS met the statutory, constitutional, and prudential 
requirements to bring a motion in bankruptcy court" and was not applicable in the nonjudicial 
foreclosure context. Trotter, 152 Idaho at 848, 275 P.3d at 863. The other case cited by the 
Watsons, Bank of New York v. Silverberg, 86 A.D.3d 274, 926 N.Y.S.2d 532 (2011), is also 
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not 
affirm the district court's dismissal of the Watsons' cause of action for declaratory relief. 
H. The Watsons' Cause Of Action For Injunctive Relief \Vas Properly Dismissed 
Because Of The Failure Of Their Other Claims. 
To be entitled to injunctive relief, the plaintiff must show a "substantial likelihood of 
success" on the merits of their claims. Harris, 106 Idaho at 518, 681 P .2d at 993. Here, the 
W atsons requested that the district court enjoin the foreclosure sale that was scheduled to take 
place on August 8, 2014.89 As noted earlier, the parties entered into a stipulation to enjoin the 
foreclosure proceedings pending the outcome of this case; thus, there is currently no sale 
scheduled. Nonetheless, the Watsons' claim for injunctive relief failed because they did succeed 
in stating a claim for relief based on any of their causes of action, as set forth above. As such, 
the Watsons have not shown that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and, 
therefore, their request for injunctive relief was properly dismissed. 
I. The \Vatsons Have Failed To Demonstrate That Any Error In Judicially Noticing 
Matters Outside The Complaint Impacted Their Substantial Rights. 
It is the appellant's burden to demonstrate reversible error. In accordance with this 
principle, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 provides that "[t]he court at any stage of the 
proceedings must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the 
substantial rights of the parties." I.R.C.P. 61 (emphasis added); see also Arambarri v. 
Armstrong, 152 Idaho 734,740,274 P.3d 1249, 1255 (2012) ("Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 61, courts are 
89 R. at 55. 
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to 
error not a 
correct. See Banning v. 1vfinidoka Irrigation Dist., 89 Idaho 506,510,406 P.2d 802,803 (1965). 
"[I]f an error did not affect a party's substantial rights or the error did not affect the result [ of the 
case], the error is harmless and not grounds for reversal." Myers v. Workmen's Auto Ins. Co., 
140 Idaho 495, 504, 95 P.3d 977, 986 (2004). 
1. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Judicial Notice Of The Publicly 
Recorded Documents Referenced In The Watsons' Amended Complaint. 
A court may take judicial notice of a fact "not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is 
either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or (2) capable of 
accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be 
questioned." I.R.E. 20l(b). Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b), on which the Idaho rule for 
judicial notice is based, contains identical language. Idaho courts seek to interpret the Idaho 
rules of civil procedure and rules of evidence consistent with the Federal rules. See Chacon v. 
Sperry Corp., 111 Idaho 270, 275, 723 P.2d 814, 819 (1986) ("We recently adopted the Federal 
Rules of Evidence as the rules of evidence in Idaho in order to obtain uniformity in the trial 
practice in both the state and federal courts. Lack of uniformity in the rules of procedure, as well 
as rules of evidence, creates problems for both the courts and the practitioners. These problems 
can be avoided by interpreting our rules of civil procedure in conformance with the interpretation 
placed upon the same rules by the federal courts."). 
In interpreting Federal Rule of Evidence 20I(b), the Ninth Circuit permits judicial notice 
of documents relied on in the complaint, for purposes of a motion to dismiss, even if such 
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court as 
part of the complaint' on a motion to dismiss without converting the motion to dismiss into a 
motion for summary judgment. If the documents are not physically attached to the complaint, 
they may be considered if the documents' "authenticity ... is not contested" and "the plaintiffs 
complaint necessarily relies" on them ... under Fed.R.Evid. 201, a court may take judicial notice 
of "matters of public record.") In fact, this Court indicated its agreement with this proposition in 
Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho at 833, 243 P.3d at 649, where it noted that its precedents were 
not in conflict with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Tellabs, Inc. v. Makar Issues 
& Rights. Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007), which allowed for a court to take judicial notice of 
documents incorporated into the complaint by reference in deciding a motion to dismiss. 
Bank of America requested that the district court take judicial notice of publicly recorded 
documents that were referenced in the Watsons' complaint, but not attached to it. Specifically, 
Bank of America requested that the court take judicial notice of the Corporation Assignment of 
Deed of Trust from MERS to Bank of America that was recorded in the Kootenai County 
Recorder's Office on December 3, 2010.90 The Watsons referenced this document as well as 
other assignments of the deed of trust in their amended complaint stating, "[t]he Promissory Note 
and Deed of Trust then went through a series of assignments, and appointments of successor 
trustee's [sic] to a series of banking entities."91 Bank of America also requested that the district 
court take judicial notice of the Assignment of Deed of Trust from Bank of America to Green 
90 R. at 65. 
91 R. at 53. 
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was on 92 to 
title shows that Green Tree Servicing is the holder of the promissory note and deed of trust."93 
Finally, Bank of America requested that the district court take judicial notice of the appointment 
of Northwest Trustee as the successor trustee, which was recorded on November 5, 2013.94 
Again, the Watsons referenced this document in their amended complaint stating that Northwest 
Trustee "has been assigned as successor Trustee with power of sale."95 The Watsons did not 
contest the authenticity of those documents, nor did they provide any evidence to demonstrate 
that those documents were not part of the recorded chain of title in this case. On appeal, the 
Watsons contest the meaning and interpretation of the assignments, but not their authenticity. 96 
Because these documents were referenced by the Watsons in their amended complaint, 
Bank of America contends that the district court did not err in taking judicial notice of them in 
considering the motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for summary 
judgment. Should this Court, however, determine that the district court erred, Bank of America 
submits that such error was harmless because it did not affect the Watsons' substantial rights, 
and this Court could consider the motion to dismiss without reference to these documents. 
92 R. at 67. 
93 R. at 53. 
94 R. at 69. 
95 R. at 51. 
96 Appellants' Brief, p. 4. 
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The District Court's Decision To Take Judicial Notice Of The Chapter 13 
Bankruptcy Proceedings Did Not Impact The Watsons' Substantial Rights. 
This Court has determined that a district court may not properly take judicial notice of 
proceedings in a different case when deciding a motion to dismiss under I2(b)(6). Taylor v. 
AfcNichols, 149 Idaho at 833, 243 P.3<l at 649. An appeals court, however, wiil review a motion 
to dismiss de nova and will consider the "pleadings without consideration of the record" from the 
separate case. Id. at 836, 243 P.3d at 652. In accordance with this Court's decision in Taylor v. 
McNichols, any purported error the district court may have committed in granting judicial notice 
of the proceedings in the Watsons' Chapter 13 Bankruptcy proceedings in deciding Bank of 
America's motion to dismiss would be considered harmless. Even if the district court erred in 
taking judicial notice of these proceedings, the Watsons' substantial rights were not prejudiced 
because the ruling was correct on other grounds without reference to the bankruptcy documents. 
See Banning, 89 Idaho at 510,406 P.2d at 803. Thus, there was no reversible error committed in 
this case. 
V. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Bank of America respectfully requests that this Court uphold 
the district court's decision dismissing the Watsons' amended complaint with prejudice. 
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